A Conditional Access baseline policy set
On this page
- Baseline policy set — the design the agent proposes
- Step zero: check for Microsoft-managed policies
- Conditional Access is deny-by-exception
- Structural principles (apply before any specific policy)
- Baseline — E3 / P1 (Business Premium, E3)
- Additions at E5 / P2
- Level 2 hardening — only after Level 1 is enforced
- Beyond benchmark guidance — Microsoft-recommended, cite Microsoft not benchmark guidance
- Prerequisites Microsoft names that are easy to miss
- Sizing the baseline to the organisation
- Standard exclusion set — and how to talk about it
- Naming
Baseline policy set — the design the agent proposes
Every recommendation traces to a benchmark guidance control in
. Where this file goes beyond benchmark guidance, it
says so.
Step zero: check for Microsoft-managed policies
Before designing anything, ask whether the tenant already has Microsoft-managed policies.
Microsoft creates these automatically in eligible tenants, in report-only, and **enables them
no less than 45 days later** unless the admin sets them to Off (28 days' notice by email and
Message center). See .
Consequences for baseline design:
- Half of the proposed baseline may already exist. Duplicating it is a Medium finding.
- A customer who "hasn't started yet" may be weeks from enforced MFA on Microsoft's schedule.
Leaving a managed policy in report-only is not deferral — Off is deferral.
- Managed policies need break-glass exclusions too, and are not covered by whatever process
the customer applies to their own policies.
Conditional Access is deny-by-exception
A policy scoped to a group protects that group. It does not restrict anyone else — an access
token is issued by default when no policy condition triggers a control. To actually restrict
an application you need a second, explicit Block policy for everyone outside the intended
group. Microsoft states this directly; see .
Structural principles (apply before any specific policy)
- Mind the tenant limit. 240 policies per tenant, counting On, Off and Report-only.
A benchmark guidance-aligned baseline is 10–14, so this only matters when reviewing a large existing
estate — but stale report-only experiments do consume the budget.
- One security outcome per policy. Never bundle. Separate policies combine as AND,
which is what you want; controls inside one policy combine as AND or OR, which is
where designs go wrong.
- The AND/OR trap. Within a policy you choose Require all or Require one of. MFA
and device compliance in one policy with "require one of" means a compliant device
satisfies it without MFA. Correct construction is two policies:
(Require MFA) AND (compliant OR hybrid joined). This is benchmark guidance's central point
and the most valuable single correction the agent makes.
- Break-glass excluded from everything, always.
- Report-only first, minimum one week, review sign-in logs, then enforce.
- All resources, not selected apps, for the MFA policies — scoping to selected apps
leaves the admin portals and Azure Service Management API reachable for reconnaissance.
- Never all-administrators-excluded. Excluding the admin population from CA to "avoid
lockout" inverts the security model.
- Trusted locations are never the sole control.
Baseline — E3 / P1 (Business Premium, E3)
Deploy in this order. Order is not arbitrary: prerequisites first, lowest blast radius
first, highest user impact last.
| # | Policy | Users | Resources | Condition | Control | benchmark guidance | Initial state |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | (Prerequisite) Emergency access accounts created, excluded, tested | — | — | — | — | 1.1.2 | Done before anything else |
| 1 | Block legacy authentication | All users | All resources | Client apps: Exchange ActiveSync + Other clients | Block | 5.2.2.3 | On (benchmark guidance goes straight to On) |
| 2 | Require MFA — administrators | Admin directory roles | All resources, no exclusions | — | Require MFA or strength | 5.2.2.1 | Report-only |
| 3 | Require MFA — all users | All users | All resources, no exclusions | — | Require MFA or strength | 5.2.2.2 | Report-only |
| 4 | Admin session controls | Admin directory roles | All resources | — | Sign-in frequency ≤ 4h; never persistent browser | 5.2.2.4 | Report-only |
| 5 | Block device code flow | All users | All resources | Auth flows: device code flow | Block | 5.2.2.12 | Report-only |
| 6 | Block authentication transfer | All users | All resources | Auth flows: authentication transfer | Block | 5.2.2.17 | Report-only |
| 7 | Require managed device | All users | All resources | — | Compliant OR hybrid joined, require one of | 5.2.2.9 | Report-only |
| 8 | Managed device to register security info | All users | User action: register security information | — | Compliant OR hybrid joined, require one of | 5.2.2.10 | Report-only |
| 9 | Intune enrolment protection | All users | Microsoft Intune Enrollment | — | MFA + sign-in frequency Every time | 5.2.2.11 | Report-only |
| 10 | Periodic reauthentication | All users | All resources | — | Sign-in frequency ≤ 7 days | 5.2.2.13 | Report-only |
Policy 8 requires a Temporary Access Pass policy alongside it. Without TAP, new hires
and users with replaced devices cannot register and cannot be onboarded. Never propose 8
alone.
Policies 7 and 8 require Intune compliance policies to exist first, plus benchmark guidance
(unassigned devices marked not compliant). Setting 4.1 and enforcing 7 in the same change
window can lock out every device with no assigned compliance policy.
Additions at E5 / P2
| # | Policy | Users | Condition | Control | benchmark guidance | State |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11 | Sign-in risk | All users | Sign-in risk High + Medium | MFA + sign-in frequency Every time | 5.2.2.7 | Report-only |
| 12 | User risk | All users | User risk High | MFA + require password change + Every time | 5.2.2.6 | Report-only |
Both require an MFA registration path first — a user with no registered method is blocked,
not challenged, and needs admin recovery.
Mixed licensing: if only part of the population holds P2, scope 11 and 12 to a group
containing exactly the licensed users. A risk policy scoped to All users in a partly
licensed tenant is a design error.
Level 2 hardening — only after Level 1 is enforced
Present these as a later phase, never in the initial baseline. Gate on: L1 enforced,
break-glass tested, usability impact accepted.
| Policy | Notes | benchmark guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Phishing-resistant MFA for administrators | Pre-register admins first or you lock them out. Breaks IE-based PowerShell credential prompts | 5.2.2.5 |
| Block medium/high sign-in risk | E5 only. Long report-only period — false positives are environment-specific | 5.2.2.8 |
| Define trusted named locations | IP ranges only; country locations cannot be trusted | 5.2.2.14 |
| Exclusionary geographic controls | No prescribed country list. Strands travellers; needs VPN exception | 5.2.2.15 |
| Token protection | Native apps only, no browser support. Windows GA; macOS/iOS preview | 5.2.2.16 |
Beyond benchmark guidance — Microsoft-recommended, cite Microsoft not benchmark guidance
From and
:
| Policy | Why | Placement |
|---|---|---|
| Secure the MFA registration page (My Security Info) | Unprotected registration lets an attacker register their own method and own the account permanently | Microsoft puts this in Phase 1 |
| Require MFA for device join and device registration (user action) | Blocks rogue device registration used for persistence | Phase 2 |
| Require approved client apps or app protection policy | Mobile protection | Phase 2 |
| Guest access protected by strong authentication | Scope via includeGuestsOrExternalUsers rather than excluding guests everywhere | Phase 2 |
| Lock the directory sync account to a trusted named location | A compromised sync account can manipulate synchronisation, create accounts and escalate privileges from anywhere. One of the few places location is the right primary control | Any time |
| Block access from unknown/unsupported platforms | Required companion to token protection, which only covers Windows and Apple | With token protection |
| Privileged Access Workstation policies | Microsoft's caveat: needs a real PAW strategy and provisioned devices first — do not recommend casually | Phase 3, mature orgs |
Also available, not benchmark guidance-backed:
- Application-enforced restrictions for unmanaged browser access (limited web session)
- Conditional Access App Control session policies (requires Defender for Cloud Apps)
- Terms of use as a grant control for external users
- Authentication context for step-up on sensitive actions
- Filter for devices and filter for applications (Microsoft prefers the latter over
naming apps individually — it scales and avoids policy size limits)
- Workload identity Conditional Access for service principals (separate licensing)
- Continuous access evaluation review
- Protected actions — require fresh MFA before anyone can create, modify or delete a CA
policy. This protects the policies themselves and is rarely implemented.
- Contingency policies held in report-only for outage scenarios — see
05-rollout-and-rollback.md. Nothing in benchmark guidance covers this and almost nobody does it.
Prerequisites Microsoft names that are easy to miss
- Cross-tenant access settings can trust MFA, device compliance and hybrid claims from a
partner's home tenant. This is the correct answer to "guests can't satisfy our device
policy" — better than blanket exclusion.
- **Application Proxy apps set to Passthrough preauthentication cannot be governed by
Conditional Access at all.** Change to Microsoft Entra ID preauthentication first.
- Custom controls do not satisfy the MFA claim requirement. A tenant relying on one
believes it has MFA coverage and does not. Migrate to external authentication methods.
- ADAL bypasses Conditional Access, CAE and token protection. Support ended 30 June 2023.
If a policy appears not to apply to an application, ADAL is a prime suspect.
Sizing the baseline to the organisation
| Profile | What changes |
|---|---|
| Under 50 users, Business Premium, no Intune | Policies 1–6 and 10 only. Device policies are aspirational until MDM exists — say so rather than recommending controls they cannot satisfy |
| 50–300, Business Premium/E3, Intune deployed | Full E3 baseline, 1–10 |
| 300+, E3 | Full E3 baseline; stage 7–9 by department |
| E5 with ID Protection | Add 11–12; consider L2 after L1 is enforced |
| Regulated / security-paramount | L1 then L2; document the usability impact acceptance |
| MSP-managed | Add delegated partner access review and per-tenant break-glass |
Standard exclusion set — and how to talk about it
Exclusions the agent may propose, each with the risk stated:
| Exclusion | Justification | Risk to state |
|---|---|---|
| Emergency access accounts | Required by benchmark guidance on every policy | The accounts themselves must be hardened and monitored |
Microsoft Rights Management Services (00000012-0000-0000-c000-000000000000) | External access to sensitivity-labelled documents | Narrow and app-specific; acceptable |
| Guests, from device-compliance policies | No managed device in the resource tenant | Guests then need their own MFA/strength policy — do not simply leave them uncovered |
| Service accounts | Cannot perform interactive MFA | Time-boxed only. Prefer workload identity CA, managed identity, or blocking interactive sign-in |
| Named pilot exclusions during rollout | Staged deployment | Must have a removal date and an owner |
Never propose: excluding all administrators; excluding a group that ordinary Group
Administrators can modify (benchmark guidance warning); permanent exclusions with no owner or
review date; excluding "All users" from anything.
Naming
Policies must be named so their purpose is readable without opening them. See
.