AccessPilot Knowledge Base

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A Conditional Access baseline policy set

A sequenced set of policies to deploy, in the order that keeps prerequisites ahead of impact.
Published by Urbannerd Consulting · Reviewed 2026-07-29

Baseline policy set — the design the agent proposes

Every recommendation traces to a benchmark guidance control in

. Where this file goes beyond benchmark guidance, it

says so.

Step zero: check for Microsoft-managed policies

Before designing anything, ask whether the tenant already has Microsoft-managed policies.

Microsoft creates these automatically in eligible tenants, in report-only, and **enables them

no less than 45 days later** unless the admin sets them to Off (28 days' notice by email and

Message center). See .

Consequences for baseline design:

Leaving a managed policy in report-only is not deferral — Off is deferral.

the customer applies to their own policies.

Conditional Access is deny-by-exception

A policy scoped to a group protects that group. It does not restrict anyone else — an access

token is issued by default when no policy condition triggers a control. To actually restrict

an application you need a second, explicit Block policy for everyone outside the intended

group. Microsoft states this directly; see .

Structural principles (apply before any specific policy)

  1. Mind the tenant limit. 240 policies per tenant, counting On, Off and Report-only.

A benchmark guidance-aligned baseline is 10–14, so this only matters when reviewing a large existing

estate — but stale report-only experiments do consume the budget.

  1. One security outcome per policy. Never bundle. Separate policies combine as AND,

which is what you want; controls inside one policy combine as AND or OR, which is

where designs go wrong.

  1. The AND/OR trap. Within a policy you choose Require all or Require one of. MFA

and device compliance in one policy with "require one of" means a compliant device

satisfies it without MFA. Correct construction is two policies:

(Require MFA) AND (compliant OR hybrid joined). This is benchmark guidance's central point

and the most valuable single correction the agent makes.

  1. Break-glass excluded from everything, always.
  2. Report-only first, minimum one week, review sign-in logs, then enforce.
  3. All resources, not selected apps, for the MFA policies — scoping to selected apps

leaves the admin portals and Azure Service Management API reachable for reconnaissance.

  1. Never all-administrators-excluded. Excluding the admin population from CA to "avoid

lockout" inverts the security model.

  1. Trusted locations are never the sole control.

Baseline — E3 / P1 (Business Premium, E3)

Deploy in this order. Order is not arbitrary: prerequisites first, lowest blast radius

first, highest user impact last.

#PolicyUsersResourcesConditionControlbenchmark guidanceInitial state
0(Prerequisite) Emergency access accounts created, excluded, tested1.1.2Done before anything else
1Block legacy authenticationAll usersAll resourcesClient apps: Exchange ActiveSync + Other clientsBlock5.2.2.3On (benchmark guidance goes straight to On)
2Require MFA — administratorsAdmin directory rolesAll resources, no exclusionsRequire MFA or strength5.2.2.1Report-only
3Require MFA — all usersAll usersAll resources, no exclusionsRequire MFA or strength5.2.2.2Report-only
4Admin session controlsAdmin directory rolesAll resourcesSign-in frequency ≤ 4h; never persistent browser5.2.2.4Report-only
5Block device code flowAll usersAll resourcesAuth flows: device code flowBlock5.2.2.12Report-only
6Block authentication transferAll usersAll resourcesAuth flows: authentication transferBlock5.2.2.17Report-only
7Require managed deviceAll usersAll resourcesCompliant OR hybrid joined, require one of5.2.2.9Report-only
8Managed device to register security infoAll usersUser action: register security informationCompliant OR hybrid joined, require one of5.2.2.10Report-only
9Intune enrolment protectionAll usersMicrosoft Intune EnrollmentMFA + sign-in frequency Every time5.2.2.11Report-only
10Periodic reauthenticationAll usersAll resourcesSign-in frequency ≤ 7 days5.2.2.13Report-only

Policy 8 requires a Temporary Access Pass policy alongside it. Without TAP, new hires

and users with replaced devices cannot register and cannot be onboarded. Never propose 8

alone.

Policies 7 and 8 require Intune compliance policies to exist first, plus benchmark guidance

(unassigned devices marked not compliant). Setting 4.1 and enforcing 7 in the same change

window can lock out every device with no assigned compliance policy.

Additions at E5 / P2

#PolicyUsersConditionControlbenchmark guidanceState
11Sign-in riskAll usersSign-in risk High + MediumMFA + sign-in frequency Every time5.2.2.7Report-only
12User riskAll usersUser risk HighMFA + require password change + Every time5.2.2.6Report-only

Both require an MFA registration path first — a user with no registered method is blocked,

not challenged, and needs admin recovery.

Mixed licensing: if only part of the population holds P2, scope 11 and 12 to a group

containing exactly the licensed users. A risk policy scoped to All users in a partly

licensed tenant is a design error.

Level 2 hardening — only after Level 1 is enforced

Present these as a later phase, never in the initial baseline. Gate on: L1 enforced,

break-glass tested, usability impact accepted.

PolicyNotesbenchmark guidance
Phishing-resistant MFA for administratorsPre-register admins first or you lock them out. Breaks IE-based PowerShell credential prompts5.2.2.5
Block medium/high sign-in riskE5 only. Long report-only period — false positives are environment-specific5.2.2.8
Define trusted named locationsIP ranges only; country locations cannot be trusted5.2.2.14
Exclusionary geographic controlsNo prescribed country list. Strands travellers; needs VPN exception5.2.2.15
Token protectionNative apps only, no browser support. Windows GA; macOS/iOS preview5.2.2.16

From and

:

PolicyWhyPlacement
Secure the MFA registration page (My Security Info)Unprotected registration lets an attacker register their own method and own the account permanentlyMicrosoft puts this in Phase 1
Require MFA for device join and device registration (user action)Blocks rogue device registration used for persistencePhase 2
Require approved client apps or app protection policyMobile protectionPhase 2
Guest access protected by strong authenticationScope via includeGuestsOrExternalUsers rather than excluding guests everywherePhase 2
Lock the directory sync account to a trusted named locationA compromised sync account can manipulate synchronisation, create accounts and escalate privileges from anywhere. One of the few places location is the right primary controlAny time
Block access from unknown/unsupported platformsRequired companion to token protection, which only covers Windows and AppleWith token protection
Privileged Access Workstation policiesMicrosoft's caveat: needs a real PAW strategy and provisioned devices first — do not recommend casuallyPhase 3, mature orgs

Also available, not benchmark guidance-backed:

naming apps individually — it scales and avoids policy size limits)

policy. This protects the policies themselves and is rarely implemented.

05-rollout-and-rollback.md. Nothing in benchmark guidance covers this and almost nobody does it.

Prerequisites Microsoft names that are easy to miss

partner's home tenant. This is the correct answer to "guests can't satisfy our device

policy" — better than blanket exclusion.

Conditional Access at all.** Change to Microsoft Entra ID preauthentication first.

believes it has MFA coverage and does not. Migrate to external authentication methods.

If a policy appears not to apply to an application, ADAL is a prime suspect.

Sizing the baseline to the organisation

ProfileWhat changes
Under 50 users, Business Premium, no IntunePolicies 1–6 and 10 only. Device policies are aspirational until MDM exists — say so rather than recommending controls they cannot satisfy
50–300, Business Premium/E3, Intune deployedFull E3 baseline, 1–10
300+, E3Full E3 baseline; stage 7–9 by department
E5 with ID ProtectionAdd 11–12; consider L2 after L1 is enforced
Regulated / security-paramountL1 then L2; document the usability impact acceptance
MSP-managedAdd delegated partner access review and per-tenant break-glass

Standard exclusion set — and how to talk about it

Exclusions the agent may propose, each with the risk stated:

ExclusionJustificationRisk to state
Emergency access accountsRequired by benchmark guidance on every policyThe accounts themselves must be hardened and monitored
Microsoft Rights Management Services (00000012-0000-0000-c000-000000000000)External access to sensitivity-labelled documentsNarrow and app-specific; acceptable
Guests, from device-compliance policiesNo managed device in the resource tenantGuests then need their own MFA/strength policy — do not simply leave them uncovered
Service accountsCannot perform interactive MFATime-boxed only. Prefer workload identity CA, managed identity, or blocking interactive sign-in
Named pilot exclusions during rolloutStaged deploymentMust have a removal date and an owner

Never propose: excluding all administrators; excluding a group that ordinary Group

Administrators can modify (benchmark guidance warning); permanent exclusions with no owner or

review date; excluding "All users" from anything.

Naming

Policies must be named so their purpose is readable without opening them. See

.